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Introduction 
In this paper, I study how the implementation of the European Monetary Union 
(EMU), which involves the adoption of a single currency and a common monetary policy 
by all members, impacted its core members (Germany, Spain, France and Italy). 
Specifically, I examine how the implementation of the EMU affected the core members’ 
experience with macroeconomic shocks and consequently, how effective a common 
monetary policy is in meeting their individual economic objectives. The EMU stands as 
one of the most significant macroeconomic experiments of our time. It represents the 
largest, in economic and demographic terms, economic and monetary union ever 
attempted. The core members make up a dominant portion of the EMU’s economic 
output and its decision-making process and thus, an analysis of their EMU integration 
experience highlights the dynamics behind developments in the EMU. The core 
members’ EMU experiences also offer insight for potential EMU members and provide a 
reference point for other monetary or economic and monetary unions around the world. 
 I use Structural Vector Autoregressions (SVARs) to model the core members’ 
experience with EMU integration. Using SVARs, I generate impulse response graphs 
(IRGs) to illustrate how macroeconomic shocks propagate through the monetary 
transmission mechanisms (MTMs) of the different core EMU countries. Since the euro 
and the single monetary policy came into effect on January 1st 1999, I perform this 
exercise on two sub-samples: 1991-1997 and 2000-2006 to describe MTMs before and 
after the implementation of the common currency and the single monetary policy. By 
comparing IRGs of individual core EMU members across the two time periods, I can 
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gauge their MTMs’ evolutions and find evidence for or against MTM convergence and 
consequently, monetary policy success. 
 In this paper, I find more evidence for than against convergence from comparing 
the evolutions of MTMs. While exchange rate and domestic interest rate components 
point towards convergence, inflation heterogeneity is increasing in the inflation 
component. My results also support monetary policy success in the EMU and pre-EMU 
period, even though there are no marked changes between the two periods. Evidence for 
monetary success puts fiscal policies as the prime suspect for diverging inflation MTM 
components among core EMU members. 
 This paper is organized as follows. Section I outlines the literature surrounding 
the EMU as well as the use of SVARs to model MTMs of EMU members. Section II 
details the model specification and Section III presents my findings, provides 
interpretations for these findings and relates them to the current literature. Section IV 
offers suggestions for future research and Section V concludes. 
I Literature Review 
 It is important to understand the context of the EMU to appreciate this paper’s 
results. Thus, I open this section with a discussion of conditions surrounding the 
formulation and implementation of the EMU. Specifically, I explain why symmetry of 
shocks to members is an important feature of a successful monetary and economic union 
and argue why MTM homogeneity is a good predictor for the symmetry of shocks. I 
disclose the reasons for employing the SVAR to model MTMs and my specification of 
the SVARs. Lastly, I summarize results of research that examine similar issues to this 
paper and discuss how their findings relate to the results of this paper.  
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The European Monetary System (EMS) preceded the EMU. The EMS was an 
agreement between various European nations to fix their national currencies with each 
other within certain bands. The purpose of this exercise was to minimize currency 
fluctuations and the resulting disruption of trade. Mundell (1963) argues that an open 
economy can choose two of the following three properties: monetary independence, fixed 
exchange rates and free flow of goods and services. Since the EMS was based on 
fostering greater flow of goods and services through fixed exchange rates, it followed that 
EMS members had to sacrifice monetary independence and embrace a single monetary 
policy. It is against this backdrop that the EMU, an agreement to adopt a common 
currency and a single monetary policy, was founded. 
Compared to the EMS, the EMU imposes further constraints on national 
economic policies by imposing a common monetary policy on its members. The success 
of the common monetary policy depends on the symmetry of shocks to the national 
economies of EMU members because the symmetry of shocks defines the homogeneity 
of national economic needs. The common monetary policy is based on EMU-wide 
economic objectives and disadvantages members whose economic needs differ 
substantially from that of the aggregate EMU economy. Thus, symmetric shocks allow 
the European Central Bank (ECB) to set a single monetary policy that better addresses 
EMU members’ national economic objectives. 
One way to measure this symmetry is by analyzing the MTMs of the EMU and 
observing how they change with time. MTMs describe how shocks propagate through 
macroeconomic variables and homogeneous (heterogeneous) MTMs indicate that shocks 
have symmetric (asymmetric) effects on the economies that the MTMs represent.  The 
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more symmetric (asymmetric) the shocks are, the more effective (ineffective) the 
common monetary policy is in managing the EMU national economies. Thus, evidence of 
converging (diverging) MTMs indicate increasing aptitude (inaptitude) of the single 
monetary policy in managing the economies represented by the MTMs.  
I use SVARs to model the MTMs of the core EMU members and analyze how 
they evolve over time in relation to each other. SVARs are a variant of vector 
autoregression (VARs), an approach credited to Sims (1980). According to Sims, VARs 
are an ideal method to simultaneously estimate relationships between variables nested in 
multiple equations without imposing suffocating a priori assumptions. SVARs are a 
specific class of VARs that employ long-run and/or short-run restrictions to integrate 
economic foundations into the exercise. 
Stock and Watson (2002) analyze the strengths and weaknesses of VARs. They 
claim that VARs perform well compared to other approaches in terms of data description 
because VARs “involve current and lagged values of multiple time series” and thus, 
“capture co-movements that cannot be detected in univariate or bivariate models.” 
Furthermore, VARs generate informative summary statistics such as Granger-causality 
tests, impulse response graphs (IRGs), and variance decompositions. This paper makes 
heavy use of IRGs to illustrate MTMs and how they change in between periods. 
IRGs delineate how shocks to one macroeconomic variable propagate through the 
macroeconomic system by showing how each macroeconomic variable in the VAR 
model responds to shocks to itself and other macroeconomic variables. By analyzing 
changes in IRGs of various periods, I can identify converging (diverging) patterns of the 
MTMs they represent and consequently, substantiate the symmetry (asymmetry) of these 
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MTMs and the increasing aptitude (inaptitude) of a single monetary policy in addressing 
national objectives. 
Taylor (1995) recommends the macroeconomic variables to use for analyzing 
closed-economy MTMs and explains the rationale behind his selection. His baseline 
closed-economy model consists of variables representing real activity, inflation and 
monetary policy, as well as relationships between the variables to model linkages 
between these three sectors. Real activity is generally represented by a measure of the 
output gap, unemployment rate or the capacity utilization rate. Inflationary data can be 
modeled with a GDP deflator such as the annualized percentage changes in consumer 
price indices or that of producer price indices. 
 On the other hand, there is a variety of possible contenders to represent the 
monetary policy reaction function. Taylor (1995) advises the use of nominal, short-term 
interest rates. Taylor (1995) advocates nominal interest rates over real interest rates 
because nominal interest rates capture information about rigidities and future 
expectations of the economy while real rates do not.  
He also argues that short-term interest rates such as money-market interest rates 
are much more indicative of monetary policy than money supply because modern central 
banks target short-term interest rates instead of money supply. Additionally, interest rates 
are more readily observable than the quantity of money. Boivin and Giannoni (2002) 
support the use of short-term interest rates that are set by market forces. The rationale 
behind their decision is that official interest rates do not necessarily provide full 
information about market conditions. Monetary authorities set official rates periodically 
with observation and implementation lags. Thus, the official rates at a certain point in 
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time do not fully describe current market conditions. Market-driven interest rates, such as 
money market rates, circumvent this problem because they are continuously updated by 
market forces. 
In order to map the influence of the EMU integration process on the currency 
component of external linkages, Dornbusch et al (1998) recommend that “exchange rate 
movements should then be separated into an intra-EMU channel and extra-EMU channel 
(mostly a dollar channel), as only the former will disappear inside EMU.” They make this 
recommendation to address the subsuming of national currencies by the euro in the final 
stage of EMU integration. The provision of the extra-EMU channel ensures continuous 
tracking of a given EMU member’s external currency linkages. However, even the 
authors acknowledge the difficulties in separating existing measures of currency 
exchange rates into extra-EMU and intra-EMU channels. 
To model the influence of external capital markets to domestic capital markets, it 
is important to include a measure of foreign interest rates. This foreign interest rate has to 
exert a dominant influence over the domestic capital market and consequently, the 
domestic interest rate. A popular measure to use is the FFR because of the influence the 
US interest rate has on international capital markets. Depending on the purpose of the 
research, other important interest rates can be used. Mojon and Peersman (2001) use the 
German interest rate to model the influence of the Bundesbank on various European 
capital markets in the pre-EMU period.  
There is a substantial amount of literature on MTM convergence among EMU 
members. The general gist of the arguments presented below is that the interest-rate pass-
through mechanism is becoming more homogeneous in the pre-EMU period than the 
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EMU period. Even though papers weighted towards pre-EMU data favors heterogeneity 
with respect to the interest rate pass-through and the interest rate channel, more recent 
studies with more EMU data supplies evidence for homogeneity in these areas. 
Furthermore, the exchange rate channel is not considered an influential component of the 
MTM. Last but not least, there is evidence of increasing heterogeneity with respect to 
inflation. With respect to observed heterogeneity, miscoordination of fiscal polices, and 
not monetary policy, appears to be the culprit. 
One of the earlier studies that use predominantly pre-EMU data is that of 
Toolsema, Sturm, and Haan (2001). They  base their study of interest rate pass-through in 
the EMU on monthly data from 1980-2000 and they report MTM divergence with respect 
to the interest rate channel because they find significant and persistent disparities in the 
interest rate pass-through from the money market rates to the capital market rates among 
the six EMU countries under observation.  Using rolling regressions and error-correction 
models (ECMs), they find no convergence patterns in the interest rate pass-through 
mechanisms among different EMU countries because they observe significant and more 
importantly, persistent differences in each country’s ECM parameters throughout the 
entire sample. The disparity among pass-through mechanisms of different EMU countries 
implies that shocks to the common monetary policy have different implications for 
different countries and thus, facilitate heterogeneity in MTMs of EMU countries.  
Another study largely based on data from the pre-EMU period is that of Clements 
et al (2001). Their paper provides evidence that heterogeneity of national interest rate 
channels in the pre-euro period persists even when heterogeneous monetary policy 
reaction functions are accounted for. Their study uses a two-block model that captures 
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both the aspect of monetary policy that can be generalized to the entire EMU and the 
aspect that caters to domestic specifications. They also supply evidence that certain 
economies identify more with the Bundesbank interest rate than others to further their 
argument that there is heterogeneity among the MTMs of EMU countries.  
Clements et al (2001) also venture into exchange rate channels by comparing 
output responses to monetary shocks when the exchange rate component is open and 
when it is closed. They find that the effects of a common monetary shock on national 
GDPs are slightly muted under flexible exchange rates than under fixed exchange rates 
for most countries but the disparity is largely insignificant. Thus, they argue that the 
exchange rate channel is weak. The exchange rate channel operates when monetary 
policy shocks induce changes in the exchange rate and in turn, the exchange rate 
motivates fluctuations in output and inflation.   
However, studies with more data from the EMU period reports elements of 
homogeneity with respect to the interest rate pass-through. Angeloni and Ehrmann (2003) 
find that interest rate pass-through mechanisms in the EMU period are more cohesive 
even though deviations from the mean do not revert faster. They support their argument 
by presenting descriptive statistics of impulse responses of lending and deposit rates to 
money market rates in the pre-euro and post-euro period. They also include non-EMU 
countries as a control group so that EMU-specific effects can be singled out.  
Contrary to the interest rate pass-through convergence, the inflation component 
provides evidence for heterogeneity. Busetti et al (2006) find that at the national level, 
inflationary patterns were converging in the pre-EMU period and are currently diverging 
into clusters in the EMU period. In their paper, they deduce these patterns by obtaining 
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inflation differentials across all possible pairings of EMU economies and then performing 
tests for convergence and divergence in the pre-euro and post-euro samples respectively. 
They use unit root tests on these differentials to test for convergence in the period leading 
up to the implementation of the euro in 1999 and stationarity tests to test for divergence 
in the post-euro period. They report that there is convergence in the pre-euro period and 
divergence in the post-euro period.  They report that early members of the EMU display 
strong convergence properties in the pre-euro sample while later entrants, such as Spain, 
Portugal and Greece, experience persistent inflation differentials with their peers. They 
also find that the post-euro period is characterized by a clustering of inflation rates into 
three separate groups. There is a lower inflation group that consists of Germany, France, 
Belgium, Austria, Finland and a higher inflation group that comprises Spain, 
Netherlands, Greece, Portugal and Ireland. Italy is situated between these two groups.  
It is possible that the observed inflation asymmetry stems from the heterogeneous 
effect of monetary policy. Hanson, Hurst, and Park (2006) explore how monetary policy 
promotes asymmetric ramifications in the context of US states. They find that states with 
lower than average growth experience more severe recessions from monetary policy 
contractions and enjoy more muted booms from monetary policy expansions compared to 
other states. This asymmetric experience between states of differing economic 
performance can be extrapolated to the EMU case. The EMU monetary policy targets 
aggregate EMU macroeconomic variables and this aggregate data is heavily weighted 
towards larger EMU economies. Hence, it is possible that the implementation of the 
common monetary policy is biased against smaller economies that are at different cycles 
from larger economies and thus, have different objectives.  
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Cicarelli and Rebucci (2002) provide mixed evidence for the homogeneous 
impact of monetary policy. They study the convergence of core EMU (Germany, France, 
Italy, and Spain) economies’ individual output responses to monetary policy shocks. In 
their model, they employ time-varying parameters and allow for interdependence 
between countries observed. They report that the magnitude of the cumulative impact of 
monetary policy shocks is homogeneous even though the timing of these impacts is 
different. This homogeneous impact implies monetary success. However, they also find 
the differences in timing of impacts to be persistent in both pre-euro and post-euro 
samples even though the parameters of MTMs were changing. This persistent temporal 
difference undermines the argument for monetary success. 
Böwer and Guillemineau (2006) offer evidence that monetary policy is successful 
for the entire EMU population. A defining property of unsuccessful monetary policy is 
that instead of minimizing welfare losses from inflation and output gap fluctuations for 
all EMU members, monetary policy impacts EMU members asymmetrically and 
aggravates cyclical disparities between their economies. Böwer and Guillemineau (2006) 
find that the implementation of the EMU intensified business cycle synchronization 
among EMU members and consequently, improved the aptitude of monetary policy in 
addressing national economic objectives. 
Boivin and Giannoni (2002, 2006) provide a method to measure monetary success 
that can be applied to the IRGs generated in this paper. They argue that insignificant 
output and inflation responses to monetary innovations are characteristic of a successful 
monetary policy. Their analysis of post-1980 US monetary policy finds that impulse 
responses of output and inflation to monetary policy shocks are quantitatively 
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insignificant. However, they claim that this observation stems from the effectiveness of 
monetary policy in reacting to output and inflation variations instead of from its 
impotency in influencing output and inflation. They argue that monetary policy shocks 
motivate lower output and inflation responses when monetary policy tracks inflation and 
output gap fluctuations more effectively.   
Since there is insufficient evidence that monetary policy is responsible for 
promoting heterogeneity, it is likely that fiscal policies may be the culprit. The 
heterogeneous effects of fiscal policy can be traced to differences in the fiscal 
transmission mechanism and/or differences in the fiscal behavior of the EMU members. 
There is little to no research on the effects of fiscal policy on EMU members. 
Theoretically, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is supposed to regulate fiscal policies 
among EMU members. However, Buti and van den Noord (2004) point to electoral 
budget cycles and a weak enforcement system as primary reasons behind fiscal 
miscoordination between EMU members. Instead of adhering to a fiscal policy that 
promotes convergence and optimizes EMU-wide objectives, certain members pursue 
discretion to maximize individual objectives. They point to the persistent deficits 
generated by Portugal, Germany and France as evidence for deviations from the SGP and 
for heterogeneous fiscal policy reaction functions. They argue that even though the EMU 
benefits from influential automatic stabilizers, such as large tax and welfare mechanisms, 
that allow for relatively high degree of cycle-smoothing, members continue to pursue 
fiscal activism. 
Eichengreen (2006) reinforces this notion of fiscal failure and monetary success 
in the EMU. Eichengreen notes that the common currency and the single monetary policy 
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has served EMU members well by providing more stability and encouraging the 
integration of European financial markets. At the same time, he argues that current fiscal 
practices among EMU members are insufficient to counterbalance the inevitable rigidities 
of using a single currency and monetary policy for a variety of economies. Eichengreen 
criticizes current EMU fiscal restrictions as arbitrary and counterproductive. He makes 
the case for more discretion but also greater rigor in analyzing public debt sustainability. 
Current fiscal restrictions encourage heterogeneous levels of monetary and fiscal 
coordination among EMU members and thus, may be responsible sustaining or even 
aggravating the divergences in MTM evolution among EMU members.  
In my paper, I find evidence for greater homogeneity in the case of the interest 
rate pass-through. This finding opposes the results of Toolsema et al (2001). However, 
my results with respect to interest rate pass-through are similar to Angeloni and Ehrmann 
(2003) and I trace the increasing homogeneity of the interest rate pass-through to the 
increasing dominance of the EMU-wide interest rate in EMU members’ MTMs.  
My results with respect to the interest rate channel agree with Cicarelli and 
Rebucci (2002) and run contrary to the findings of Clements et al (2001). Like Cicarelli 
and Rebucci (2002), I find that the cumulative impacts of EMU members’ output 
responses to monetary policy innovations are relatively homogeneous. However, the 
confidence bands around the IRGs prevent me from offering my opinion on their 
argument about the timing of the effects of monetary policy shocks. On the other hand, 
my IRGs verify the weak exchange rate channel observed by Clements et al (2001). 
Additionally, I show that the exchange rate component of MTMs exhibit convergence.  
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My findings with respect to inflation largely agree with that of Busetti et al 
(2006). Both of us observe how Spain’s MTM exhibits a significantly different inflation 
component compared to that of Germany, France and Italy. However, I do not have 
sufficient evidence to support the assertion of Busetti et al (2006) that Italy’s experience 
with inflation is diverging from that of France and Germany. 
In this paper, I find insignificant responses of output and inflation to monetary 
shocks for the core EMU members. According to Boivin and Giannoni (2002, 2006), this 
finding represents evidence for monetary success for the core EMU members and thus, 
monetary policy is not a likely source for the observed inflation asymmetry. This 
argument for monetary success echoes the findings of Böwer and Guillemineau (2006). 
It is important to note that the majority of studies discussed above work with 
quarterly data while my report is based on monthly data. Thus, disparities between our 
findings may stem from this difference in choice of the temporal units of observation. It 
is also important to note that most of the publications discussed below have only been 
able to include relatively fewer years of the EMU period in their analysis. Thus, sample 
choice may be another factor that explains discrepancies between my findings and theirs. 
Furthermore, some of the models discussed below involve making a priori assumptions 
about the type of relationships that EMU members share with each other. A popular 
example is to establish the primacy of German interest rates over other members in the 
pre-EMU period. In this paper, I try to build a generalizable model so that the differences 
between countries show up in the results rather than in the assumptions and 
specifications.  
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 II. Model 
In this paper, I model the closed-economy component with output gap, inflation 
and short-term domestic money market rates. These variables measure real activity, price 
level movements and interest rate movements respectively. To extend this closed-
economy model to an open-economy model, I need to include variables that model 
external linkages, such as foreign interest rates that have a strong influence on the 
domestic economy and important national currency exchange rates. For example, Kim 
and Roubini (2000) use the Federal Funds Rate (FFR) and the nominal exchange rate 
with respect to the US dollar to capture external linkages in their study of MTMs of 
industrialized countries.  
Additionally, I use real effective exchange rates (REERs) to provide a continuous 
measure of an EMU member’s external currency linkages. A country’s REER is 
constructed by comparing the price levels, trading volumes and nominal exchange rates 
of that country and its trading partners.1 Under the relatively fixed nominal exchange rate 
arrangements of the EMS and the common currency of the EMU, the nominal exchange 
rates between EMU members are very rigid and do not accurately represent external 
linkages because they are artificially managed. On the other hand, the REER responds to 
more than just nominal exchange rate fluctuations; it also reflects movements in domestic 
                                                 
1  The REER of a given country is constructed from its real exchange rate (RER) with respect to its trading 
partners. The RER is defined as RER = e(P/P*). e is the nominal exchange rate (e = foreign 
currency/domestic currency), P is domestic price level and P* is the foreign price level.  
 The REER is indexed to a base year (by) and thus, the REER of a given country for the current year (cy) is 
defined as  = wREERi
cy
i=1
n∑ i ( ) / ( ), where n is the number of trading partners the given 
country has, w
RERi
cy RERi
by
i is the proportion of trade volume between the given country and country i to total trade 
volume of the given country and RERi is the real exchange rate between the given country and country i. 
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inflation, foreign inflation and trading patterns. Thus, the REER provides a less rigid 
measure of external linkages that more accurately represents external linkages.  
I use the EMU-wide interest rate because it provides continuity throughout both 
the pre-EMU and EMU period and because it is required to examine how the EMU-wide 
interest rate passes to national interest rates. The Bundesbank has been the dominant 
force behind interest rate movements in Europe in the pre-EMU period but in the EMU 
period, the decision to set interest rates lies in the hands of the European Central Bank 
(ECB). Eurostat provides a continuous measure of the EMU-wide interest rate that is 
constructed by weighting and aggregating pre-EMU national interest rates and appending 
it to ECB rates in the EMU period. Thus, Eurostat’s EMU-wide interest rate provides a 
continuous foreign, but European, interest rate. Its identity as an European interest rate 
also allows exploration into the interest rate pass-through mechanism that demonstrates 
how well national capital markets are integrated into the EMU capital market. A rapid 
and complete pass-through of shocks from the EMU-wide interest rate to that of domestic 
interest rates intimates that the observed domestic capital market is synchronized and 
integrated into the general EMU capital market, vice versa.  
I specify my preliminary SVAR model as: 
Yt = A(L). Yt  + et
where Yt = [i , EMUt xt   , π t   , i  , t ∆ rt ]` in order of decreasing exogeneity or increasing 
endogeneity , A(L) is a matrix of weights on current and lagged values of Yt  and et 
represents the error terms.  
iEMUt  is the EMU-wide short-term interest rate. is the monthly output gap 
derived by applying a Hodrick-Prescott filter with the smoothing parameter at 14400 on 
xt
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the monthly data of seasonally-adjusted industrial production, π t is the annualized 
monthly inflation rate, i  is the monthly short-term money-market interest rate and r is 
the first difference of the real effective exchange rate.
t t
 2
In the SVAR, I use the following short-run restriction:  
et = Ω . ut
 Where et = [ei , eEMUt x t , eπ t , e i , et ∆ r t ]’, Ω is a lower triangular matrix and  
ut = [ui , uEMUt x t , uπ t , ui , ut ∆ r t ]’.  The e’s represent error terms of the relationships in the 
model and the u’s represent structural shocks. 
Each country’s model is estimated for two sub-samples of monthly data: the pre-
EMU period, 1991M01 to 1997M12, and the EMU period, 2000M01 to 2006M09. I 
selected the beginning of the sample size to minimize the impact of shifts due to German 
Reunification. Also, the Eurostat data on the monthly EMU-wide interest rate starts at 
this point and it provides me with a consistent and continuous source for and measure of 
EMU-wide interest rates.3 I omit observations for years 1998 and 1999 to account for the 
adjustment period to the Euro and to the ECB’s single monetary policy. I believe their 
omission will better portray changes in the MTM correlated with the introduction of the 
                                                 
2 All the data, except i  and i  for France, was obtained from the International Financial Statistics 
website (
EMU
t t
www.imfstatistics.org).  I obtained i  for France from short-term commercial paper rate from the 
Banque de France website and I acquired i from the Eurostat website 
(
t
EMU
t
www.europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/).
3 I could construct a measure of EMU-wide interest rates that stretch further back than the one provided by 
Eurostat. To do so, I could assign appropriate weights to existing data on important interest rates in the 
EMU and aggregate them in the time period before the Eurostat dataset starts. However, this course of 
action may cause continuity errors that create artificial shifts in the data and undermine the integrity of the 
research effort. Thus, I choose to stick with the Eurostat data. 
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single currency and the common monetary policy. My choice for the endpoint of the 
dataset is based on availability. 
In total, there are eight models; two for each country, spanning the two time 
periods noted above. For each country, I compare the IRGs from both time periods to 
extract information about how their MTM changed. To gauge shifts in MTM 
convergence, I derive patterns of change across core members by comparing their 
respective MTM evolutions. 
Stationary tests on the variables entered into the model return mixed results and 
thus, I cannot reject the possibility of spurious relationships in the model. However, I 
persist on entering certain variables at levels for two reasons. Firstly, certain 
macroeconomic variables are known to have cyclical components that fluctuate around a 
stationary component. The relatively short time period considered in this project may not 
provide sufficient time for cycles to resolve and thus, may be responsible for 
exaggerating the cyclical component and obscuring the stationary aspect. Secondly, Sims 
(1992) advises against rendering non-stationary variables stationary because if the 
variables turn out to be cointegrated, the model may be misspecified. For my model, I 
enter output gap, inflation, EMU interest rates and domestic interest rates at levels and 
the REER at first differences. The choice for REER to be at first differences is to 
complement inflation because part of REER is derived from comparing price levels and 
inflation is a representation of first differences of price levels. As a robustness check 
against spurious relationships, I estimate another model by entering the first-difference of 
all variables into the original model. I find the resulting IRGs to be qualitatively similar 
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and thus, this exercise substantiates my choice of using variables at levels even if they are 
non-stationary. 
 I use the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) to specify the lag order of each 
model. The AIC selects the appropriate amount of lags based on the marginal 
improvement in information that each lag order brings to the model. It penalizes the 
inclusion of each lag order and thus, lag orders that do not bring a significant amount of 
improvement to the model do not score well and are not recommended for use. Due to the 
small sample size that is available to me, I follow the AIC’s recommendation up to four 
lags to preserve degrees of freedom. 
Table 1 
  Test results for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
 White X White LM_1 LM_2 LM_3 LM_4 
DE (pre-EMU) 0.2621 0.2085 0.3212 0.0346** 0.5899 0.191 
DE (EMU) 0.0333** 0.000*** 0.068* 0.4965 0.1839 0.1981 
ES (pre-EMU) 0.003*** 0.0018*** 0.4198 0.0314** 0.2303 0.2314 
ES (EMU) NA 0.0065*** 0.3059 0.1179 0.2908 0.384 
FR (pre-EMU) NA 0.2239 0.6453 0.1009 0.9703 0.5618 
FR (EMU) 0.3444 0.0504* 0.0508* 0.0103** 0.8296 0.3812 
IT (pre-EMU) 0.0001*** 0.0002*** 0.489 0.0018*** 0.0278** 0.9734 
IT (EMU) 0.0939* 0.1145 0.0054*** 0.0842* 0.0608* 0.7814 
DE – Germany  * - statistically significant at the 90% confidence level 
ES – Spain  ** - statistically significant at the 95% confidence level 
FR – France  *** - statistically significant at the 99% confidence level 
IT - Italy 
  
Tests for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation on the models indicate the 
prevalence of these problems in the model. Due to software limitations, I am unable to 
correct these problems without undermining the VAR approach. Table 1 underlines the 
severity of each issue among the models. It shows the results of the White 
heteroskedasticity test with cross terms (White X) and without (White). It also provides 
results for LM serial autocorrelation test for lag order 1 (LM_1), 2 (LM_2), 3 (LM_3) 
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and 4 (LM_4). The existence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation affects the size of 
the confidence bands surrounding the IRGs. However, large confidence bands are a 
constant issue in the VAR literature. Even though the large bands are detrimental to the 
statistical significance of my findings, I believe that the IRGs still provide useful and 
important information about the MTMs. 
III. Discussion of Results 
  My results show that there are converging features for the interest rate 
component and the exchange rate component of MTMs across core EMU members. 
However, I find increasing heterogeneity in the inflation component. Convergent 
(divergent) features represent evidence for increasing symmetry (asymmetry) among the 
MTMs of the core members and testify towards the increasing aptitude (inaptitude) of the 
single monetary policy. Results indicate monetary success and hence, the observed 
heterogeneity may stem from national fiscal policy miscoordination instead of monetary 
failure. 
I find homogeneous features with respect to the interest rate pass-through 
mechanism of EMU-wide interest rates to domestic interest rates. Graph 1 shows how 
domestic short-term money market rates  become more responsive to the EMU-wide 
interest rate shocks  compared to domestic interest rate shocks for all models when one 
goes from the pre-EMU period (’91-’97) to the EMU period (’00-’06).  Additionally, 
there are no noticeable changes for INT responses to other variables. The general pattern 
of increasing pass-through of EMU-wide rates to the domestic money market rate 
underlines the increasing homogeneity and symmetry of this channel for the core EMU 
members.  
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I also estimate pass-through equations based on Kaufmann and Scharler (2006). 
Kaufmann and Scharler (2006) analyze financial systems and estimate a pass-through 
equation to measure the influence of deposit rates on lending rates. In this paper, I modify 
their pass-through equations to gauge the influence of the EMU-wide interest rate on 
individual members’ domestic interest rates and verify observations from IRGs about 
interest rate pass-through.   
 My version of their equation is: 
it = ß0i  + ßEMUt 1i  t 1−
The intuition behind the equation is that the current domestic interest rate depends 
on the current EMU-wide interest rate and the lagged domestic interest rate. By 
examining the evolution of the coefficients of the independent variables, ß0 and ß1, I will 
be able to determine changes in the significance and influence of the respective 
independent variables. 
  I specify the equation at levels for the four EMU economies based on data from 
the pre-EMU period and the EMU period.  Table 2 illustrates a pattern of increasing 
dominance of EMU-wide rates in the interest rate channel that is similar to Graph 1. 
These results substantiate the EMU rates as the dominant force in homogenizing and 
promoting symmetry in the interest rate component of EMU MTMs. Interestingly, the 
general pattern of change between the pre-EMU and the EMU period becomes more 
difficult to discern when I enter the variables at first differences or at greater lags. One 
possible explanation for this is that crucial information is lost when the data is considered 
at first differences instead of levels. Furthermore, the marginal cost of including 
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additional lags, such as decreasing the statistical significance of lags in the baseline 
model, exceeds the marginal benefits from the increase in information that they provide. 
Table 2 shows how the larger core economies, Germany and France, are isolated 
from EMU-wide interest rates in the pre-EMU period but with the implementation of the 
EMU, the EMU-wide interest rate significantly influences the domestic interest rate. The 
smaller economies, Italy and Spain, experience a significant pass-through from EMU-
wide interest rates in both periods and the pass-through of EMU-wide interest rate is 
stronger in the EMU period than the pre-EMU period. From Table 2, it also appears that 
the pass-through became considerably stronger in Italy compared to Spain. In the EMU 
period, the EMU-wide interest rate becomes the dominant force in Italy while the lagged 
domestic interest rate maintains an equal influence in comparison to the EMU-wide 
interest rate in Spain. 
Chart 1 tracks the movement of domestic short-term interest rates among core 
EMU members as well as that of the EMU-wide interest rate. It provides further evidence 
that the domestic money market rates for EMU members have converged in the aftermath 
of the introduction of the euro and ECB interest rates on 1st January 1999. The results 
from these exercises verify the findings of Angeloni and Ehrmann (2003) that the pass-
through mechanism is converging for all EMU members at the monthly level. 
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Graph 1 
 Domestic interest rate response to EMU-wide 
interest rate shocks 
 
Domestic interest rate response to domestic 
interest rate shocks 
 Pre-EMU EMU Pre-EMU EMU 
DE 
   
ES 
   
FR 
  
IT 
  
 The red lines represent the confidence bands based on a 95% confidence level. 
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Table 2 
Statistics of pass-through coefficients 
 ß0 ß1
DE (pre-EMU) -0.00852(-0.3668) 1.001512***(32.2231) 
DE (EMU) 0.431506***(11.2499) 0.552663***(13.6354) 
ES (pre-EMU) 0.239927***(5.0263) 0.800435***(21.3266) 
ES (EMU) 0.43897***(11.2219) 0.543977***(13.1519) 
FR (pre-EMU) -0.01326(-0.0909) 1.004703***(6.0754) 
FR (EMU) 0.272746***(2.8266) 0.740217***(8.1876) 
IT (pre-EMU) 0.110283**(2.34627) 0.913363***(27.9213) 
IT (EMU) 0.860659***(28.4647) 0.135282***(4.5033) 
DE – Germany  * - statistically significant at the 10% significance level 
ES – Spain  ** - statistically significant at the 5% significance level 
FR – France  *** - statistically significant at the 1% significance level 
IT – Italy  t-statistics in parentheses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 1 
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 Another convergent feature among the MTMs lies in the exchange rate 
component. Graph 2 demonstrates that the immediate response of the first difference of 
REER to shocks to itself becomes more muted in the EMU period compared to during the 
pre-EMU period for all EMU core members. Furthermore, the differences between the 
immediate responses of core EMU members are smaller in the EMU period than during 
the pre-EMU period. Additionally, Graph 3 shows how the response of to the 
EMU-wide interest rate shocks is becoming more homogeneous for all core EMU 
members in the EMU period. 
∆ rt
Furthermore, the responses of output and inflation to r are insignificant, as are the 
exchange rate response to monetary policy shocks for all EMU core economies in both 
the pre-EMU and EMU period. This provides evidence for a weak exchange rate channel 
in the spirit of Clements et al (2001). There appears to be no significant changes in the 
influence of the exchange rate channel between the two time periods. This can be 
attributed to the existence of rigid exchange rate agreements in the EMS that are 
comparable to the euro arrangement under the EMU. 
 Moreover, Graph 4 demonstrates how inflation response to shocks to itself 
remains relatively the same for DE, FR and IT from the pre-EMU period to the EMU 
period. However, inflation becomes more volatile for ES.  
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Graph 2 
                                             ∆ response to shocks to rt ∆ rt  
 Pre-EMU EMU 
DE 
  
ES 
 
 
FR 
  
IT 
  
 The red lines represent the confidence bands based on a 95% confidence level. 
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Graph 3 
             ∆ response to EMU-wide interest rate shocks rt
 Pre-EMU EMU 
DE 
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The red lines represent the confidence bands based on a 95% confidence level. 
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Graph 4 
                 Inflation response to shocks to inflation 
 Pre-EMU EMU 
DE 
ES 
 
FR 
 
IT 
 
The red lines represent the confidence bands based on a 95% confidence level. 
Note: When the period is set to 100, the inflation response for Spain during the EMU period 
converges to 0 in an oscillatory manner 
` 28
29
Surajat: A Study of Monetary Transmission Mechanism Convergence and Moneta
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2007
Chart 2 tracks the evolution of inflation among the core EMU members from 
January 1991 to September 2006. It shows how Spain is considerably more volatile than 
its core EMU peers when it comes to inflation fluctuation in the EMU period. In the pre-
EMU period, Spain’s inflation volatility is relatively similar to that of DE and IT. This 
observation provides evidence that Spain is suffering more than its peers in coming under 
the EMU. These results on inflation tie in with the findings of Busetti et al (2006). Like 
Busetti et al (2006), I find that Spain’s experience with inflation differs from that of Italy, 
Germany and France, who have relatively similar experiences with inflation. Unlike 
Busetti et al (2006), I do not find sufficient evidence to corroborate the argument of 
Busetti et al (2006) that Italy’s experiences with inflation is different from that of France 
and Germany. 
Chart 2 
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One possible explanation is that business cycles in Spain are more out of step with 
the general EMU business cycle compared to its core EMU peers. As a result, Spain’s 
experience with inflation takes on a very different track compared to other core EMU 
members when all members are subjected to a common monetary policy that is based on 
general EMU objectives. If this argument is true, then it should be reflected in a greater 
output and inflation response to monetary policy shocks in the EMU period for Spain 
compared to that in the pre-EMU period. Graph 5 maps the responses of inflation gap to 
monetary shocks. Even though, the Spain’s response changes in direction across the two 
periods, non-response is still a possibility for both periods when one considers the 
confidence bands.  Graph 6 describes the response of output gap to monetary policy 
shocks in both EMU and pre-EMU periods for all core EMU members. All the responses 
in Graph 6 are insignificant.  
Graphs 5 & 6 demonstrate the insignificant responses of inflation and output, 
respectively, to monetary policy shocks. While some may interpret this as monetary 
policy impotency, Boivin and Giannoni (2002) argue that the insignificant responses stem 
from the success of the systematic behavior of monetary policy in minimizing the 
variability of output and inflation. As the systematic component of monetary policy 
anticipates output and inflation fluctuations better, monetary policy shocks are less likely 
to cause substantial output and inflation fluctuations. Thus, the insignificant responses in 
Graphs 5 & 6 provide evidence for monetary success among core EMU members and in 
the context of core EMU members, substantiate the assertions of Böwer and 
Guillemineau (2006) that the common monetary policy has been successful. In the 
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absence for monetary failure, fiscal miscoordination emerges as the likely candidate for 
observed inflation heterogeneity. 
Graph 5 
                                Inflation response to domestic interest rate shocks 
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 The red lines represent the confidence bands based on a 95% confidence level. 
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Graph 6 
                              Output gap response to domestic interest rate shocks 
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The red lines represent the confidence bands based on a 95% confidence level. 
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IV. Future research 
Increasing the sample size appears to be a fairly straightforward approach to 
improve this research. To do so, one can lengthen the time frame under consideration. 
Lengthening the time period makes it more likely for cycles to complete and thus, 
prevents the misspecification of cyclical behavior as linear trends and of stationary trends 
as non-stationary trends. Furthermore, the findings of this paper are limited to the core 
EMU members. By including non-core EMU members in the research project, its results 
can be extended to a larger proportion of the EMU population.  
 However, there are many exogenous shocks in the history of the EMU and the 
EMS, such as the exchange rate speculations during 1994 and the German Reunification 
in 1990-1991. The complexity of the research project increases significantly when one 
has to account for these exogenous shocks in the model. Similarly, inclusion of more 
EMU members for analysis makes comparing and contrasting IRGs a more taxing 
exercise. Last but not least, data availability may prove to be a problem when one tries to 
expand the period and/or the number of EMU members under observation. 
 Another area of improvement for this paper is to account for the fiscal policy 
component, especially since this may be an important explanatory variable for the 
inflation heterogeneity that this paper finds. However, it may be difficult to devise a 
fiscal policy reaction function considering the ambiguous application of SGP. 
Furthermore, the EU regional policy poses conundrums for modeling the effects of 
supranational fiscal policy because EU regional policy allows for wealth transfers from 
one EMU member to another and its effects are not reflected in national fiscal indicators.  
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 Aside from accounting for the fiscal policy, future research should also work 
harder to detail the exact role of monetary policy. Specifically, future efforts can examine 
whether my finding of monetary failure stems from good policy and/or good fortune. 
This paper provides evidence that monetary policy has been relatively successful in the 
pre-EMU and EMU periods but its results may stem from a period of mild economic 
shocks rather than a period of prudent monetary policy. It is possible that with more 
sophisticated techniques, such as that of Boivin and Giannoni (2006), one can separate 
the roles that policy and environment have in instigating shocks and in influencing their 
propagation in the economy. 
V. Conclusion 
 In this paper, I find that there is evidence for convergence in the exchange rate 
and interest rate components of the MTMs of core EMU members in the aftermath of the 
implementation of the common currency and the single monetary policy. However, the 
inflation components exhibit divergence. Convergence patterns intimate increasing 
aptitude with respect to the single monetary policy while the increasing heterogeneity of 
inflation components represent a factor that may eventually undermine the effectiveness 
of the common monetary policy in addressing national objectives. Insignificant responses 
of output and inflation to monetary policy shocks suggest the single monetary policy is 
currently successful for core EMU members. Thus, the single monetary policy is an 
unlikely source for the observed heterogeneity and the culprit may be national fiscal 
policy miscoordination among the core EMU members. 
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